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Show and Tell?:
Students’ Personal Lives, Schools, and Parents
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN
Public schools learn about their students’ personal lives in many
ways. Some are passive: a teacher observes a student kissing someone, or
overhears a conversation among friends. But schools also engage in more
active information-gathering about students’ personal lives, through
surveys and informal conversations between students and teachers,
administrators, school psychologists, counselors, coaches, and other
personnel. This Article explores the competing privacy considerations that
result from such encounters. Once schools have learned highly personal
information about their students, does it violate those students’ privacy
rights to disclose that information to their parents? Or does keeping the
information secret violate the parents’ constitutional right to direct the
upbringing of their children, often framed as a privacy right of its own?
And what are the limits on schools’ ability to probe for such information in
the first place?
This Article brings together the parallel lines of cases addressing these
questions, showing how students’ and parents’ privacy interests converge
in the context of schools’ extraction of students’ personal information, only
to be pitted against each other regarding the disclosure of such
information. Moreover, it explores the underlying normative question that
links the extraction and disclosure issues: how should schools approach
their—to some extent, inevitable—role in students’ personal and family
lives? This Article argues that recognizing stronger limitations on schools’
ability to probe into students’ personal lives, while giving schools broad
discretion as to how to handle such information provided that it has been
legitimately obtained, is not only consistent with both of the constitutional
privacy interests at stake, but also good policy.
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Show and Tell?:
Students’ Personal Lives, Schools, and Parents
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Charlene Nguon was a sixteen-year-old high school junior when her
principal told her mother that she was being suspended for engaging in
“inappropriate public displays of affection” with her girlfriend, thereby
informing her mother that she was gay.1 “My mom picked me up from
school and her eyes were all watery,” Charlene later recalled. “I just went
to my room and cried. We didn’t talk about it for about a week.”2 Later,
however, Charlene and her mother not only spoke but took action.
Charlene, through her mother, sued her principal, alleging that he had
violated her constitutionally protected right to privacy by disclosing her
sexual orientation to her mother.3 After a bench trial, a California district
court ultimately ruled against Charlene’s claim.4
During the very same week that Charlene lost her case, another
sixteen-year-old girl located across the country also lost her legal challenge
to the way the state had handled information about her sexual behavior.
Her claim, however, came from the opposite perspective. Melissa
Anspach, who had gone to a public health center for the morning-after pill,
alleged that the center’s employees had violated her constitutional rights to
bodily integrity and parental guidance by giving her the tablets without
first apprising her parents of the situation.5 Melissa’s parents, through
whom she brought the lawsuit, also brought their own claim, alleging that
their familial privacy rights—i.e., their right to direct the upbringing of
∗
Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002; B.A., Yale
University, 1999. This paper was the official selection from the “Call for Papers” held by the
Association of American Law Schools Section on Defamation and Privacy in connection with its
program, entitled “Under the Parental Gaze in the 21st Century: Children’s Privacy Rights Against
Their Parents,” at the January 2014 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. I
thank the other speakers at this program—Gaia Bernstein, Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Pamela LauferUkeles, Andrea Matwyshyn, Paul Ohm, and Laura Rosenbury—for their helpful and thoughtprovoking comments during the event.
1
Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181–83, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
2
Tamar Lewin, Openly Gay Student’s Lawsuit Over Privacy Will Proceed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2005, at A21.
3
Nguon, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
4
Id. at 1198–99.
5
Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 258–60 (3d Cir. 2007).
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their daughter—had been infringed by the center’s behavior. The Third
Circuit, however, rejected the Anspachs’ case in full.7
These two lawsuits, taken in juxtaposition, illustrate some difficult
questions raised when government entities—most often, but not
exclusively, public schools—learn highly personal information about
minors, particularly adolescents. Does disclosing such information to their
parents violate the minors’ privacy rights? Or does keeping it secret violate
the parents’ constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children,
often framed as a privacy right of its own? In both of the above cases, the
state ultimately won, suggesting that government entities have a fair degree
of discretion when deciding whether to disclose personal information or
not. But what are the limits of that discretion? When does disclosing—or
not disclosing—a minor’s personal information to his or her parents violate
the Constitution? And what are the limits on the state’s ability to probe for
such information in the first place?
This Article explores the ways that minors’ and parents’ constitutional
privacy interests converge and diverge across these questions, focusing on
public schools’ extraction (through surveys, informal questioning, and
other means) and disclosure of information about students’ personal lives.
The extraction and disclosure issues, while separately analyzed by
scholars, have rarely been considered together, especially from a
constitutional perspective.8 But stepping back to consider how the
extraction and disclosure questions relate to each other is illuminating, for
several reasons.
First, on a practical level, the same school-student interaction
surrounding a student’s personal information can raise issues of both
extraction and disclosure. For example, the Fifth Circuit recently
6

Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 274.
8
Regarding schools’ extraction of information, see generally Kathleen Conn, Counterpoint:
Parents’ Right to Direct Their Children’s Education and Student Sex Surveys, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 139
(2009); Tara Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really Know? 37 J.L. &
EDUC. 143 (2008); Maxine Eichner, Counterpoint and Rebuttal: School Surveys and Children’s
Education: The Argument for Shared Authority Between Parents and the States, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 459
(2009). On schools’ disclosure of such information, see, e.g., Caitlin M. Cullitan, Please Don’t Tell My
Mom: A Minor’s Right to Informational Privacy, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 417 (2011); Adam J. Kretz, The
Right to Sexual Orientation Privacy: Strengthening Protections for Minors Who Are ‘Outed’ in
Schools, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 381 (2013); Melissa Prober, Note, Please Don’t Tell My Parents: The
Validity of School Policies Mandating Parental Notification of a Student’s Pregnancy, 71 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 557 (2005). A few scholars have looked at both extraction and disclosure issues regarding
students’ personal information in the context of various federal statutes, including the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment, but they have
largely focused on the statutory rather than the constitutional issues. See generally Lynn M. Daggett,
Student Privacy and the Protection of Pupil Rights Act as Amended by No Child Left Behind, 12 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 51 (2008); Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Education Informational Privacy
for Public Schoolchildren, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1158 (2006).
7
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rejected—in a two to one split—a student’s claim that her public school
coaches violated her constitutional rights by interrogating her about her
sexual orientation and then “outing” her to her mother.9
Second, at a doctrinal level, the extraction and disclosure issues each
implicate the same two constitutional interests, both of which stem from
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and are usually framed in
privacy terms: (1) the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
(often referred to as the right to informational privacy)10 and (2) the
parental interest in directing the upbringing of one’s children (often
referred to as the right to “familial” privacy).11 What is striking is that
these two privacy rights generally dovetail when it comes to schools’
extraction of students’ personal information—which can infringe both
students’ informational privacy and their parents’ familial privacy—only to
be pitted against each other regarding the disclosure of that information to
parents. Looking at the extraction and disclosure questions together, then,
is a useful lens for considering the scope and relationship of these two
privacy rights. I suggest that where the two privacy rights converge, as is
often the case in the context of extracting students’ personal information,
the constitutional limitations on schools should be strong. By contrast,
where the two privacy interests diverge, as in the disclosure context,
schools should have more room to exercise their own discretion, and
constitutional liability for disclosure or non-disclosure to a student’s
parents should attach only in extreme circumstances.
Finally, the extraction and disclosure issues raise a common core of
normative concerns. What links them is the underlying question of how
schools should approach their role in students’ personal and family lives.
Recognizing clearer limitations on schools’ ability to extract students’
personal non-academic information, while giving them broad discretion as
to how to handle such information provided that it has been legitimately
obtained, is not only consistent with both of the constitutional privacy
interests at stake, but is also good policy.
This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part II discusses schools’
extraction of students’ personal non-academic information. Such
information can conceivably relate to a wide range of topics, but in
practice, it most often involves students’ attitudes and behaviors regarding
sex and drugs. Although there is a federal statute regarding schools’ ability
to extract such personal information through surveys and other
evaluations—the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment12—this statute
does not include an express private right of action and has not been held
9

Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 499–501, 510 (5th Cir. 2013).
See infra Part II.A.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (2012).
10

704

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:699

13

enforceable under Section 1983. The litigation in this area has therefore
centered on the constitutional front. I examine the privacy-based
challenges to schools’ extraction of this sort of information, exploring how
they can be framed in both informational privacy and familial privacy
terms, and arguing that although there are certain tensions within each
formulation, they generally converge in a way that points toward strong
protection.
Part III then addresses schools’ disclosure of students’ personal
information to their parents. Here, the two constitutional privacy interests
are starker, but typically point in opposite directions. Analogizing to the
space for “play in the joints” between the mandates imposed by the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, I argue that there
should be similar room for “play in the joints” here: in most situations,
schools should be able to use their best judgment as to whether to disclose
students’ personal information to parents, provided that they have
legitimately obtained the information and are not motivated by malice,
without fearing liability under an informational privacy theory if they
disclose or under a parental privacy theory if they do not.
Part IV explores the regime that my proposed approach would create. I
suggest that it will beneficially reduce the potential for schools to
forcefully insert themselves into the family dynamic and disrupt the parentchild relationship.
II. EXTRACTION OF STUDENTS’ INFORMATION
Schools learn students’ personal information in many ways. Some are
simply passive: a teacher observes a student kissing someone, or overhears
a conversation among friends. But schools also engage in more active
information-gathering about students’ personal lives, through both surveys
and more informal encounters between students and teachers,
administrators, school psychologists, counselors, coaches, and other
personnel. The federal Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA),
originally passed in 1974 and most recently amended in 2002 as part of the
No Child Left Behind Act, states that students should not be “required” to
“submit to a survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information”
concerning the student’s or family’s political beliefs, family problems, sex
behavior or attitudes, and other personal matters, without prior parental

13
See, e.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
the parties had dismissed their Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment claim in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), that the analogous Family
Educational Records Privacy Act was not enforceable); see also Daggett, supra note 8, at 108–09
(explaining that in light of Gonzaga, “it seems clear that PPRA claims are similarly non-actionable
under Section 1983” and adding that “the administrative enforcement option is fairly toothless”).
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consent. Yet the PPRA has played a minimal role in cases challenging
schools’ extraction of students’ personal information. Not only is it unclear
whether the PPRA’s reference to surveys, analyses, and evaluations
encompasses school personnel’s informal interactions with students,15 but
the PPRA has also been interpreted to lack any private means of
enforcement.16
Accordingly, students’ and parents’ challenges to schools’ extraction
of their information have centered on constitutional claims. Such lawsuits
sound in an informational privacy theory, a familial privacy theory, or
both. But both of these privacy rights are notoriously murky—and neither
is perfectly on point here.
A. Informational Privacy
1. The Informational Privacy Right: An Overview
The first key challenge to a public school’s extraction of a student’s
personal information is an informational privacy claim, typically brought
by parents on the minor student’s behalf. The concept of an informational
privacy right stems from the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Whalen v.
14

20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (2012). The exact language covers information concerning
(1) political affiliations or beliefs of the student or the student’s parent; (2) mental or
psychological problems of the student or the student’s family; (3) sex behavior or
attitudes; (4) illegal, anti-social, self-incriminating, or demeaning behavior; (5)
critical appraisals of other individuals with whom respondents have close family
relationships; (6) legally recognized privileged or analogous relationships, such as
those of lawyers, physicians, and ministers; (7) religious practices, affiliations, or
beliefs of the student or student’s parent; or (8) income (other than that required by
law to determine eligibility for participation in a program or for receiving financial
assistance under such program).

Id. §§ 1232h(b)(1)–(8). In addition to stating that prior parental consent is needed for “required”
surveys, id. § 1232h(b), the PPRA goes on to provide notice and opt-out rights for parents with respect
to all surveys that address the topics above. Id. at §§ 1232h(c)(2)(A)–(C). As Daggett describes, the
PPRA does not make clear precisely what counts as a “required” survey. Daggett, supra note 8, at 122–
23.
15
See, e.g., Daggett, supra note 8, at 91 (“It seems clear that use of a formal instrument qualifies
as a survey or evaluation. What about an interview of a student by a guidance counselor to help identify
causes of a student’s academic difficulty?”).
16
See C.N., 430 F.3d at 171 n.13 (explaining that parties dropped their Protection of Pupil Rights
Amendment claims in light of the decision that no right to private action exists under the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act). Nor does the better-known Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) play a role here. In addition to lacking a private right of action, FERPA does not
focus on the collection of information from students, but rather on the confidentiality of educational
records. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); see also Daggett, supra note 8, at 61 (“FERPA requires schools to
keep what they know about students confidential; PPRA keeps schools from learning certain
information about students in the first place.”). For purposes of this Article, which focuses on K-12
public education, FERPA is also not relevant to Part III—disclosure—because it does not grant any
privacy rights to children under the age of eighteen.
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Roe. There, the Court observed:
The cases sometimes characterized as protecting “privacy”
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests.
One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions.18
The latter privacy strand, sometimes captured by the term “decisional
privacy,” encompasses familiar issues including contraception, abortion,
refusal of medical treatment, and—as discussed further below—
childrearing.19 But the former strand, now often referred to as
“informational privacy,” has been much less developed by the Supreme
Court. The Whalen Court seemed to endorse the concept that some sort of
constitutional right to informational privacy exists, but the Court never
described it in detail or articulated a standard for determining whether it
had been violated. Instead, the Court simply held that the challenged
governmental action—New York’s practice of keeping a centralized
database with information about prescription drug-users—did not violate
this right because there were safeguards against further public disclosure,
and because requiring the disclosure of private information to the New
York Department of Health itself was not “meaningfully distinguishable
from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated
with many facets of health care.”20
Since Whalen, the Supreme Court has directly addressed the
informational privacy concept in just two cases: Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services21 and NASA v. Nelson.22 The Nixon Court easily rejected
former President Nixon’s claim that his constitutional right to privacy was
violated by the requirement of the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act that he release his presidential papers and tape recordings
for archival review and screening.23 The Court explained that Nixon’s
privacy interest was “weaker than that found wanting in . . . Whalen” and
was outweighed by the public interest in preservation of presidential
materials.24 In NASA, decided in 2011, the Court returned to the
informational privacy concept, but again declined to develop it—or even to
explicitly endorse it. Instead, the Court simply “assume[d], without
deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort
17

429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Id. at 598–600 (internal footnotes omitted).
19
DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2d ed. 2006).
20
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601–04.
21
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
22
131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
23
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455–57, 465.
24
Id. at 458–59.
18
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mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.” It then concluded that the government
action at issue—conducting background checks of NASA contract
employees—did not violate that right.26
Given the Supreme Court’s lack of elaboration as to the informational
privacy right, lower courts have fleshed it out on their own. As the NASA
Court noted, “[s]tate and lower federal courts have offered a number of
different interpretations of Whalen and Nixon over the years.”27 Every
circuit except for the D.C. Circuit has now recognized a constitutional right
to informational privacy, but the scope of protection varies. While the
Sixth Circuit has held that any such right should only apply to information
relating to those rights “that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,’”28 most other circuits have adopted broader
views. The Tenth Circuit, for instance, has described the informational
privacy right as generally “protect[ing] the individual from governmental
inquiry into matters in which it does not have a legitimate and proper
interest.”29 The Third Circuit has also taken a more “encompassing
view,”30 looking at whether the information is “within an individual’s
reasonable expectations of confidentiality.”31
The circuits also differ as to how they measure infringement of the
informational privacy right. They generally use a sort of balancing test,
weighing the governmental justification for the invasion against the
strength of the privacy interest at stake, in various formulations. The Tenth
Circuit, for instance, requires the state to show a “compelling state
interest” for the privacy invasion,32 and the Seventh Circuit has held that
the informational privacy right “is defeasible only upon proof of a strong
public interest in access to or dissemination of the information.”33 The
Third Circuit has adopted a multi-factor balancing test that looks at
the type of record requested, the information it does or might
contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent
25

NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 751.
Id.
27
Id. at 756 n.9.
28
Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 260 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting J. P. v. DeSanti,
653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981)); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t., 305 F.3d
566, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting J. P., 653 F.2d at 1090).
29
Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
30
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).
31
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1987). The
Seventh Circuit has used similar language, describing the informational privacy right as encompassing
“medical, sexual, financial, and perhaps other categories of highly personal information—information
that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers.” Wolfe v. Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir.
2010).
32
Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sheets v. Salt Lake
Cnty., 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995)).
33
Wolfe, 619 F.3d at 785.
26
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nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the
relationship in which the record was generated, the adequacy
of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree
of need for access, and whether there is an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access.34
Courts similarly have varying approaches as to whether minors possess
informational privacy rights. All three circuits that have explicitly
addressed the issue—the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—concluded that
minors have such rights, but the scope of protection varies by circuit.35 The
Third and Ninth Circuits essentially use the same balancing framework for
analyzing informational privacy claims regardless of whether the claimant
is an adult or minor.36 The Tenth Circuit, by contrast, has adopted a
different test for analyzing minors’ informational privacy claims. Instead
of applying the “compelling state interest” standard that it uses for adults’
informational privacy claims, it looks at whether the government action
“serve[s] ‘any significant state interest . . . that is not present in the case of
an adult.’”37
Finally, the case law is also murky as to whether the informational
privacy right applies to governmental acquisition of personal information
or whether it solely covers the further disclosure of such information—a
crucial question when it comes to public schools’ extraction of students’
personal information, as discussed below.38 The Supreme Court’s brief
34
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit
has followed this approach. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir.
2002) (analyzing privacy rights using the same multi-factor balancing test).
35
For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Helen L. Gilbert, Comment, Minors’ Constitutional
Right to Informational Privacy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1382–88 (2007) (explaining the circuit
courts’ different approaches to assessing minors’ informational privacy claims and arguing that each of
these approaches fail to protect “minors’ particular vulnerabilities”).
36
See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the
constitutional right to privacy extends to minors, but is subject to the same limitations as the privacy
right of adults); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., 307 F.3d at 789–90 (refusing to overturn Arizona’s
parental consent abortion statute by reasoning that the statute reasonably preserve’s a pregnant minor’s
confidential information). Of course, the age of the plaintiff may be taken into account in conducting
the balancing inquiry, which is very fact-specific.
37
Aid for Women, 441 F.3d at 1119 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs.
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977)).
38
For a discussion of this distinction in the related context of privacy-based torts, the availability
of which vary by state, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007,
2012, 2032–33 (2010). Strahilevitz describes and largely rejects the distinction drawn by William
Prosser between the torts of “intrusion upon seclusion” (which is acquisition-based) and “public
disclosure of private facts” (which is disclosure-based). “There is no reason why the torts for intrusion
upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts should look different from each other,”
Strahilevitz argues. Id. at 2032. “The keys to each tort are whether the defendant’s actions intruded
upon private information and whether the defendant’s conduct violated existing norms of social
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discussions of informational privacy have focused on the disclosure
context. When the Supreme Court first articulated the privacy right at stake
in Whalen, it framed it as the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.”39 And the Whalen Court relied on a distinction between
governmental acquisition and disclosure of personal information in its
holding, emphasizing that the patient information in question would only
be received by a state agency and not shared with the public.40 Similarly, in
NASA, the Supreme Court stated that one weakness of the plaintiffs’
informational privacy claim was that they were “attack[ing] only the
Government’s collection of information,” without pointing to a genuine
threat of further disclosure.41
Lower courts, however, have sometimes been receptive to
informational privacy claims that are based on governmental informationacquisition alone. In Thorne v. City of El Secundo,42 for example, the Ninth
Circuit allowed an informational privacy claim to proceed when it
stemmed solely from the governments’ extraction of a municipal
employee’s sexual history (through polygraph questioning).43 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit has stated that the informational privacy right covers
situations where an individual does not want to “disclose highly sensitive
information to the government.”44 Similarly, in Eastwood v. Departmentt
of Corrections,45 the Tenth Circuit approved an informational privacy
claim brought by a government employee whose employers extensively
questioned her about her sexual history, explaining that the privacy right
“is implicated when an individual is forced to disclose information [to the
government] regarding personal sexual matters.”46
2. The Informational Privacy Right: Public Schools’ Extraction of
Students’ Personal Information
The informational privacy construct becomes even more complicated
when applied to public schools’ extraction of students’ personal
information. Not only do the basic questions remain about the scope of this
right and whether it covers governmental acquisition as well as disclosure
conduct—in other words, whether the conduct was highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. I return
to this distinction infra pages 715–16 and 725.
39
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (emphasis added).
40
Id. at 594, 601–02.
41
NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2011).
42
726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
43
Id. at 470.
44
Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789–90 (2002) (stating that the
informational privacy right “applies both when an individual chooses not to disclose highly sensitive
information to the government and when an individual seeks assurance that such information will not
be made public”).
45
846 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1988).
46
Id. at 629, 631.
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of information, but the unique relationship between schools and their
students adds another layer of complexity. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly set the level of protection for students’ constitutional rights
differently from the baseline standard, often ratcheting protection down47
and occasionally ratcheting it up.48 Given the Supreme Court’s scant
attention to the informational privacy right altogether, the Court has said
nothing about how this right should play out in schools. Lower courts, in
turn, have not articulated a clear framework for whether, and when,
students can have a viable informational privacy claim arising solely from
schools’ extraction of their information.
A pair of Third Circuit cases—both involving informational privacybased challenges to schools’ extraction of students’ information, but
reaching opposite results—illustrates the key issues here. In the first case,
Gruenke v. Seip,49 seventeen-year-old Leah Gruenke and her mother sued
the school’s varsity swim coach who, after suspecting that Leah was
pregnant, swung into action.50 The coach asked his female assistant to
approach Leah about whether she was pregnant, followed up himself with
Leah to try to discuss sex and pregnancy with her, and urged the school
guidance counselor and nurse to talk to her.51 Throughout these
interactions, Leah denied being pregnant.52 The coach also discussed
whether Leah might be pregnant with the mothers of fellow swim team
members and allegedly encouraged swim team members to convince Leah
to take a pregnancy test, possibly even suggesting that Leah would be
47
In the contexts of students’ First Amendment speech rights, Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, the
Supreme Court has developed tests that provide less protection for minors than that accorded to the
general population. The Supreme Court’s student speech framework, comprising Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393 (2007), Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), Bethel School
District Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), allows schools to restrict speech that would
otherwise be protected, such as speech that is plainly offensive or that could reasonably be interpreted
as encouraging illegal drug use. Similarly, for illustrations of this ratcheting-down in the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment contexts, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332–34, 340–41 (1985)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to school authorities’ searches of students, but that such
searches—rather than requiring probable cause and a warrant—need only satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s “fundamental command” of reasonableness, because “the school setting requires some
easing of the restrictions”), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 583 (1975) (holding that school
suspensions implicate students’ procedural due process rights, but that only the rudimentary aspects of
due process—notice and an informal hearing—are required, because “further formalizing the
suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as
a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process”).
48
In the Establishment Clause context, the Supreme Court has suggested that students’ youth and
impressionability can heighten the potential for a violation. See infra p. 716.
49
225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).
50
Id. at 290.
51
Id. at 296.
52
Id.
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removed from certain swim events if she did not. Leah ultimately agreed
to take a test, which was positive (though later that same day, she took two
additional tests, both of which were negative).54 She then informed her
mother—with whom the coach had never communicated—about what was
happening.55 Her mother scheduled her for a doctor’s appointment, at
which point Leah learned that she was actually almost six months
pregnant.56
In their lawsuit, Leah and her mother claimed that the coach’s actions
had violated both Leah’s right to informational privacy and their collective
right to family privacy, along with her Fourth Amendment right to be free
from illegal searches (here, the administration of a pregnancy test).57
Although their familial privacy claim failed, as discussed below,58 the
Third Circuit allowed Leah’s closely linked Fourth Amendment and
informational privacy claims to go forward.59 “[A] school cannot compel a
student to take a pregnancy test absent a legitimate health concern about a
possible pregnancy and the exercise of some discretion,” the court wrote,
explaining its Fourth Amendment ruling.60 Moreover, the circumstances
surrounding the coach’s extraction of Leah’s information—such as having
her teammates administer the test and discussing it with his assistant
coaches—meant that Leah’s claim “f[ell] squarely within the contours of
the recognized right of one to be free from disclosure of personal matters,”
i.e., the informational privacy right.61 The Gruenke court thus left open
whether, had the coach not involved anyone else in his attempt to
determine Leah’s pregnancy status but had only questioned her himself—
that is, had there been solely extraction of information, without any
disclosure—she still would have had a viable informational privacy claim
against him.
In the subsequent case of C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education,62 the
Third Circuit again left open whether students can ever have cognizable
informational privacy claims arising solely from public schools’ extraction

53
Id. Leah alleged that her teammates told her that the coach would take her off the relay team
unless she took the pregnancy test, although the teammates and coach denied this. Id.
54
Id. at 296–97.
55
Id. at 297.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See infra Part II.B.2 (providing an overview of parental interests in the right to familial privacy
and addressing familial privacy rights in relation to public schools’ extraction of students’ personal
information).
59
Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295.
60
Id. at 301.
61
Id. at 302–03.
62
430 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2005).
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of information. There, the school district administered a survey entitled
“Profiles of Student Life: Attitudes and Behaviors” to students in the
seventh through twelfth grades.64 The survey, which was supposed to be
voluntary and anonymous, asked students extremely personal questions
about drug and alcohol use, sexual activity, experience with physical
violence, suicide attempts, personal associations and relationships, and
their views on matters of public interest.65 The 156 questions included, for
instance, whether the student had ever had sex, whether they liked and felt
proud of themselves, whether their parents would be upset if they drank
alcohol, and whether the student agreed or disagreed with the statement
“my parents often tell me they love me.”66 After doubt emerged as to
whether the survey had actually been administered in a voluntary and
anonymous manner, three parents filed suit on behalf of themselves and
their children, alleging informational and familial privacy violations.67
Even though the Third Circuit concluded that “[a] myriad of direct and
indirect evidence coalesces to support the reasonable inference that the
survey, as actually administered, was involuntary,” it still rejected the
plaintiffs’ informational privacy claim.68 In so doing, the court applied its
basic balancing test for informational privacy claims, weighing the
governmental interest in the survey against the students’ privacy interests
at stake.69 The court described the survey as “an attempt to obtain
information directly related to the understanding and prevention of the
social problems confronting today’s youth—a laudable goal, apparently
pursued with the youths’ best interest in mind.”70 Meanwhile, “the privacy
side of the balance” was lessened given the lack of evidence that the
survey was not anonymous or that the school ever disclosed individual
student’s personal information.71 Indeed, the survey results, “while
publicly disclosed, w[ere] revealed only in the aggregate, in a format that
did not permit individual identification.”72 Thus, while the C.N. court ruled
against the informational privacy claim here, it left open whether the
outcome might have been different had the school extracted students’

63
Id. at 190 (finding no constitutional violation of the right to privacy and granting summary
judgment in favor of a public school district that administered surveys as a means of collecting
information to introduce social programs).
64
Id. at 161.
65
Id. at 161, 168–70.
66
Id. at 167–69.
67
Id. at 161, 175–77.
68
Id. at 175, 181–82.
69
Id. at 179–80.
70
Id. at 181–82.
71
Id. at 181. The court did find, however, that “the survey, as actually administered, was
involuntary.” Id. at 174.
72
Id. at 181.
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information non-anonymously. Similarly, the court implied that had it
been less clear that the school was extracting this information with the
students’ “best interests in mind,” it might have let the claim go forward.74
Should students ever have viable informational privacy claims arising
solely from schools’ extraction of their personal information? Especially
given the uncertainty over whether the informational privacy right
generally protects information-acquisition alone, there are arguments that
they should not. After all, even well-established constitutional rights, such
as freedom of speech and freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, are often ratcheted down in the school setting.75 This ratchetingdown has generally stemmed from the Supreme Court’s desire to preserve
the core of students’ constitutional protections while also responding to
schools’ needs to maintain safe and effective learning environments.76
Such school needs are often at stake when public schools seek to extract
students’ personal information. After all, public schools both educate
students about numerous personal topics (including sex and drugs) and
play an important role in protecting students’ health and safety.
Information-extraction can be useful and important in performing these
functions.
Indeed, both Gruenke and C.N. can be viewed through this lens. In
Gruenke, for instance, the swim coach’s concern that Leah was pregnant
stemmed from Leah’s own complaints of nausea and low energy,
combined with the coach’s observations that Leah frequently left swim
practice to go to the bathroom and that her body was rapidly changing.77
There is nothing to suggest that the coach’s interest was prurient; indeed,
the coach’s first reaction was to have the female assistant coach speak with
her and he also asked a doctor whether it would be safe for Leah to
continue swimming competitively if she were pregnant.78 Similarly,
nothing in C.N. suggests that the Ridgewood School District’s motives for
administering the student life survey were improper. In fact, the survey
was conducted at the behest of a group comprised of social service
agencies that wanted to “survey Ridgewood’s student population to better
understand their needs, attitudes and behavior patterns in order to use the

73
Indeed, in Rhoades v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 888, 899 (N.D. Ind.
2008), the district court denied summary judgment to a school that administered a psychological
assessment to high school students in a non-anonymous fashion.
74
C.N., 430 F.3d at 181–82.
75
Supra note 47.
76
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332–34, 340–41 (1985) (balancing students’ Fourth
Amendment privacy protections with the need for schools to maintain order and security, as well as an
effective learning environment).
77
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2000).
78
Id. at 296–97.
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town’s programs and resources more effectively.” Education professor
Kathleen Conn has pointed to cases like C.N. to argue that “[p]ublic school
educators acting in loco parentis have a right and a responsibility to
determine the sexual awareness of their students so that they can adopt
curricula that teaches healthy ways of dealing with sexual language,
information, and impulses.”80
Of course, educators’ motives in extracting students’ personal
information are not always so benign. In Wyatt v. Fletcher,81 a Fifth Circuit
case decided in May of 2013, a student alleged that her softball coaches,
prompted by animosity toward her, interrogated her about her sexual
orientation, accused her of being in a sexual relationship with another
female, and threatened the student by not allowing her to play softball until
she told her mother about the relationship.82 There, allegations of malice
were prominent.
But even assuming that in most cases, educators are well-intentioned
when they probe for students’ personal information, there are still reasons
to recognize a counterveiling privacy interest on students’ part. Indeed,
informational privacy concerns can be heightened in the public school
setting precisely because of students’ youthfulness and school personnel’s
power and influence over them. When school officials seek to extract
information from students, students may not feel free to refuse to provide
it, even if the questioning is theoretically voluntary. Here, too, Gruenke
and C.N. are illustrative. Leah repeatedly refused to take a pregnancy test,
even writing a letter to her coach denying that she could be pregnant, but
she finally gave in and took the test.83 Similarly, in C.N., several students
reported having the impression—accurately or not—that they would
“receive a cut” if they did not fill out the survey.84
Relatedly, when schools want students to provide information, they
may not be motivated to emphasize that students can decline to do so. In
C.N., although the principal did tell the school officials administering the
survey that it was voluntary, the administrators spent much of their time
instead focusing on “how best to get the students to take the survey
seriously.”85 Tellingly, the survey instructions themselves did not even
explicitly state that the survey was voluntary. Rather, they told the
students:

79

C.N., 430 F.3d at 162.
Conn, supra, note 8, at 150.
81
718 F.3d 496, 499–501, 510 (5th Cir. 2013).
82
Id. at 510–11; Wyatt v. Kilgore Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 6:10–cv–674, 2011 WL 6016467, at *1–
2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011).
83
Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 296.
84
C.N., 430 F.3d at 167.
85
Id. at 165.
80
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Today, during this period, you have an opportunity to express
your views . . . . This survey should take 45 minutes to
complete. Please take advantage of the full amount of time,
since we will be using the entire period for this purpose.
Please make no identifying marks on your survey. Please
begin.86
Such language, as the C.N. court noted, “echo[ed] what students might
hear before mandatory state testing.”87
Additionally, even when students do decline to provide information in
response to school officials’ questioning, they still may feel that their
privacy has been infringed by the encounter. In A Taxonomy of Privacy,
Daniel Solove describes “information collection” as a distinct type of
privacy invasion, and describes a particular practice of such collection—
“interrogation”—that has particular resonance for the public school
context.88 Solove writes:
Interrogation is the pressuring of individuals to divulge
information. Interrogation has many benefits; it is useful for
ferreting out information that others want to know.
However, interrogation can create harm. Part of this harm
arises from the degree of coerciveness involved. The Fifth
Amendment privilege protects against highly coercive
interrogation about matters with enormous personal stakes
for the examined subject. However, for interrogation
generally, the compulsion need not be direct; nor must it rise
to the level of outright coercion. . . . Interrogation forces
people to be concerned about how they will explain
themselves or how their refusal to answer will appear to
others. . . .
Like disclosure, interrogation often involves the divulging of
concealed information; unlike disclosure, interrogation can
create discomfort even if the information is barely
disseminated.89
Not only are students likely to be concerned about how their refusal to
answer will appear to school personnel, but the substance of the questions
86

Id. at 167.
Id. at 175.
88
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491–501 (2006)
(discussing the harms of interrogation and its invasive nature in the face of excessively prying
questions); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 38, at 2033 (defining “invasion of privacy” as an
infringement on private facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, and acts to “engender[] social
harms that exceed the associated social benefits”).
89
Solove, supra note 88, at 500–01 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
87
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themselves, particularly if they are explicit, may themselves also infringe
students’ sense of personal privacy.
The ways in which students’ particular sensitivities can heighten the
informational privacy concerns raised by schools’ probing for their
information suggest that perhaps, rather than ratcheting down the
constitutional protection, courts should heighten it. Although the
ratcheting-down model is certainly more common in the public school
context, there is at least one arguable precedent for ratcheting-up: the
treatment of Establishment Clause issues in public schools. The Supreme
Court has suggested that public school students’ youth, impressionability,
and susceptibility to pressure from the school community can increase the
likelihood of an Establishment Clause violation. “The Court has been
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment
Clause in elementary and secondary schools,” the Supreme Court wrote in
Edwards v. Aguillard.90 “Students in such institutions are impressionable
and their attendance is involuntary. The State exerts great authority and
coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because
of the students’ emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s
susceptibility to peer pressure.”91 Such concerns can easily translate over to
situations in which public schools probe for their students’ personal
information, and deserve to be weighed against the justifications for such
school behavior.
Given the general uncertainty over whether the informational privacy
right covers information-acquisition alone—along with the particular
questions about how the right should apply in the public school setting—
the informational privacy construct, while important, is certainly not a
perfect stand-alone method for challenging public schools’ extraction of
students’ personal information. Yet it rarely does stand alone. In almost all
cases where such school behavior is challenged, another privacy-based
claim is brought as well: that the school has violated not only the rights of
the student, but also the rights of his or her parents. Accordingly, I now
turn to this category of claims in Part II.B, and then look at the two species
of privacy claims together in Part II.C to analyze the synergy between
them.

90

482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987).
Id. at 584 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court emphasized the special
characteristics of kindergarten through twelfth grade students in ruling that a middle school had
violated the Establishment Clause by having a rabbi deliver the graduation ceremony’s invocation and
benediction. 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“[W]e think the State may not, consistent with the
Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this position. Research in
psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure . . . .”).
91
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B. Familial Privacy
1. The Familial Privacy Right: An Overview
In contrast to the informational privacy right’s fairly recent lineage, the
notion that parents have a fundamental due process right to control the
upbringing of their children dates back nearly a century. In the Supreme
Court’s most recent discussion of this right—Troxel v. Granville92—the
Court observed:
The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer
v. Nebraska, we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a
home and bring up children” and “to control the education of
their own.” Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
we again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians”
includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”93
This parental interest is often described as a privacy right of its own: a
right to familial privacy. The First Circuit, for instance, has stated that
“[t]he due process right of parental autonomy might be considered a subset
of a broader substantive due process right of familial privacy.”94 Other
courts have used similar terminology.95
Despite the long history of the parental autonomy right, its contours
remain somewhat murky. In Troxel, although the Court referred to this
right as “fundamental,”96 its plurality opinion did not employ the
traditional strict scrutiny test for claims involving infringements of
fundamental rights, instead simply striking down the challenged
Washington statute for non-parental visitation as “breathtakingly broad.”97
Justice Thomas, while concurring, wrote separately to critique the plurality
for its failure to articulate the standard of review, emphasizing that he
would apply strict scrutiny here.98
This omission was not an anomaly. Rather, the question about which
92

530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 65 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)).
94
Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 102 (1st Cir. 2008).
95
See, e.g., Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the plaintiff had the
right to choose private-school educations for her child under “the penumbra of familial privacy rights”).
96
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
97
Id. at 67.
98
Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93
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standard of review to apply connects with underlying questions about what
the right protects in the first place. As David Meyer has written:
In large part, the Court’s parental-rights cases remain
profoundly murky regarding the balance they strike between
private and communal interests in childrearing because they
rest uncomfortably upon two competing and as-yetunreconciled metaphors: the family as a “private refuge”
from a brutal or indifferent community and the state as
“protector” of children from a brutal or indifferent
family . . . .
Subsequent cases have made it clear that the Court regards
some form of heightened scrutiny as appropriate whenever
the state intrudes significantly upon a parent’s basic decision
concerning child rearing. In recent decades, the Court has
stated repeatedly that a parent has a “fundamental liberty
interest” in “‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children.’” And yet the Court in those
cases, still torn between the competing metaphors of family
as haven and as hell, stops short of embracing strict scrutiny
as the governing standard.
The Court has used the familiar language of strict scrutiny
—“compelling” interests and “narrow tailoring”—in only a
few of its cases dealing with the rights of parents. . . . In a
much greater number of cases, the Court seems to apply a
more free-form “reasonableness” test to government actions
that impede a parent’s child-rearing authority, implicitly
calibrating the level of scrutiny in each case to match the
particular degree of intrusion upon the parents’ interests.99
Meyer’s observation about reasonableness review certainly tracks
courts’ approach to what is probably the most frequent conflict between
parental autonomy and public schools: situations in which parents object to
aspects of the school curriculum, and assert that their parental due process
rights entitle them to opt their children out. (Such claims are often coupled
with a free exercise objection to the challenged portion of the
curriculum.)100 Although the Supreme Court has not decided a case like
this, lower courts have consistently held that the parental autonomy right—
99
David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 545–46 (2000)
(footnotes omitted).
100
See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) (claiming violations of rights under
the Free Exercise Clause and substantive parental and privacy due process rights where the student was
presented with two books that portrayed parents of the same gender).
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whether on its own or in combination with the free exercise right—only
entitles parents to opt out of the public schools altogether, not to send their
children to public school but then handpick the aspects of the experience to
which they will be exposed. The Second Circuit rejected a father’s claim
that he should be entitled to exempt his son from health education, stating
that “Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny do not begin to suggest the
existence of a fundamental right of every parent to tell a public school
what his or her child will and will not be taught.”101 Other courts have
framed the issue in similar terms.102
Courts have likewise rejected parents’ constitutional challenges to
other aspects of public school policies, such as attendance, dress, or
community service requirements.103 As the Sixth Circuit broadly reasoned
in Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School District104:
Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school
day, school discipline, the timing and content of
examinations, the individuals hired to teach at the school, the
extracurricular activities offered at the school or, as here, a
dress code, these issues of public education are generally
“committed to the control of state and local authorities.”105
Indeed, having found that no fundamental right is implicated by these
conflicts, courts regularly apply rational basis review.
Such reasoning has also usually been fatal to parental rights claims
involving public schools’ extraction of students’ personal information, to
which I now turn.
2. The Familial Privacy Right: Public Schools’ Extraction of Students’
Personal Information
The familial privacy right has, so far, been an even weaker anchor for
challenges to public schools’ extraction of students’ personal information
101

Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2003).
The First Circuit recently held out the possibility that if a school actually tried to indoctrinate
students into a certain viewpoint—as opposed to simply exposing them to materials and perhaps trying
to influence their views—that that could violate parental autonomy, the Free Exercise Clause, or both.
However, it has never actually recognized a valid indoctrination claim, nor has any other court. Parker,
514 F.3d at 105.
103
See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a
father’s claim that a middle school’s dress code was unconstitutional); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch.
Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the school district where students and parents alleged that the district’s mandatory school
uniform policy was unconstitutional); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694,
694–95 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that the school’s refusal to allow students to attend
classes part time violated students’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause, parents’ constitutional right
to direct their child’s education, and students’ rights under state law).
104
401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005).
105
Id. at 395–96 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975)).
102

720

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:699

than has the informational privacy right. In Fields v. Palmdale School
District,106 for instance, the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected several parents’
claims that an elementary school had violated their familial privacy rights
by conducting a psychological assessment of first, third, and fifth
graders.107 The assessment, comprising four questionnaires, asked students
to rate how often they experienced things like “[w]anting to yell at
people,” “[c]an’t stop thinking about something bad that happened to me,”
“[k]nown anyone who has or is being abused,” “[h]aving sex feelings in
my body” and “[c]an’t stop thinking about sex.”108 Although the school
had sought parental consent for the survey, the consent form did not
indicate the sexual nature of the survey.109 The consent letter simply
described the survey as having the goal of “establish[ing] a community
baseline measure of children’s exposure to early trauma.”110 The parents
argued that had they known of the “true nature” of the survey, they never
would have consented to their children’s involvement, and that the survey
had infringed their parental autonomy rights to decide how to expose their
children to these sensitive topics.111
The Fields court, however, used the curriculum-dispute cases
described above to rule against the parents, stating that parents “have no
constitutional right . . . to prevent a public school from providing its
students with whatever information it wishes to provide, sexual or
otherwise, when and as the school determines that it is appropriate to do
so.”112 The parents did not bring a separate informational privacy claim on
their children’s behalf, and the court did not consider the merits of such a
claim.113 The court also did not consider whether familial privacy might
have been infringed by the school’s asking of these questions because the
case solely proceeded as a challenge to the school’s information-provision.
Nor did the court consider whether familial privacy might have been
infringed by the school’s asking of these questions. The case solely
proceeded as a challenge to the school’s information-provision.114
The C.N. court rejected the Ridgewood parents’ familial privacy
claims on similar grounds. The court characterized the parents as solely
objecting to the questionnaire’s provision of information to their children:
We recognize that introducing a child to sensitive topics
106

427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1200.
108
Id. at 1201–02, 1201 n.3.
109
Id. at 1201.
110
Id. at 1200 n.1.
111
Id. at 1202.
112
Id. at 1206.
113
See id. at 1207 n.8. (“No claim is asserted that either the childrens’ or the parent’s rights were
violated because the children were compelled to disclose personal or sensitive information.”).
114
Id. at 1203.
107
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before a parent might have done so herself can complicate
and even undermine parental authority . . . . [But] [a] parent
whose middle or high school age child is exposed to sensitive
topics or information in a survey remains free to discuss
these matters and to place them in the family’s moral or
religious context, or to supplement the information with more
appropriate materials. School Defendants in no way
indoctrinated the students in any particular outlook on these
sensitive topics; at most, they may have introduced a few
topics unknown to certain individuals. We thus conclude that
the survey’s interference with parental decision-making
authority did not amount to a constitutional violation.115
The court’s analysis was thus indistinguishable from the reasoning used in
the curriculum-dispute cases. The court did not consider whether any
additional family privacy interests are raised when the school is actually
inquiring into students’ own personal and family lives.116
The decision that came closest to exploring this question is Gruenke,
where, in addition to raising an informational privacy claim on her
daughter’s behalf, the student’s mother argued that the swim coach had
violated her own familial privacy rights by trying so aggressively to
ascertain whether her daughter was pregnant, without involving her in the
process.117 The mother claimed that had the coach stayed out of the
situation and allowed the family to handle it, they would have quietly sent
Leah to live with her sister out-of-state, but the coach’s involvement
precluded this by making “the family’s dilemma a topic of conversation for
the school community.”118 Interestingly, two members of the three-judge
panel were sympathetic to this claim, writing that “[s]chool-sponsored
counseling and psychological testing that pry into private family activities
can overstep the boundaries of school authority and impermissibly usurp
the fundamental rights of parents to bring up their children, as they are
guaranteed by the Constitution.”119 This reasoning echoed, and cited, the
1973 conclusion of a Pennsylvania district court that a school’s drug
prevention program, which included administering a questionnaire to
students that asked them about their family relationships, infringed familial
115

C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3d Cir. 2005).
Unlike Fields, in which no informational privacy claim had been brought, Fields v. Palmdale
School District, 427 F.3d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005), the informational privacy issue was squarely
presented here. C.N., 430 F.3d at 184–85. The C.N. court, however, apparently viewed the extractionbased arguments as solely implicating the students’ interests, and did not discuss how the extraction of
such information might also infringe upon familial privacy. It is not clear whether the plaintiffs tried to
make a separate argument along those lines.
117
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 307.
116
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privacy. The Gruenke court ultimately concluded, however, that this
family privacy right was not clearly established enough to overcome the
coach’s qualified immunity.121
This aspect of the Gruenke majority’s approach, however, has not
gained much traction. In describing Gruenke five years later, the Third
Circuit in C.N. characterized the mother as having argued “that the swim
coach’s action deprived [her] of [her] right to make decisions concerning
[her] child.”122 This incomplete description—which left out the Gruenke
majority’s suggestion that school prying into private family activities can
itself be problematic—helped the C.N. court to conclude that the
Ridgewood survey had not violated familial privacy, because it had not
seriously infringed upon parents’ authority to make decisions regarding
their children.123
Fields and C.N. have generated critical commentary from scholars
arguing that the decisions insufficiently protected parental rights.124
120

Id. (citing Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 922 (E.D. Pa. 1973)).
Id. Meanwhile, the third judge disagreed that there had been a familial privacy violation in the
first place, writing that the claim here was simply that the coach’s
121

discussion of Leah’s pregnancy with others and his failure to inform the Gruenkes of
the pregnancy merely complicated the Gruenkes’ ability to make decisions
concerning the pregnancy. . . . [But] the Gruenkes were free at all times to make
whatever decision they pleased as to the outcome of Leah’s pregnancy, even after
[the coach] discussed her condition with other parents or swim team members.
Id. at 310 (Roth, J., concurring). Part of the divide here stems from a difference in the characterization
of the mother’s familial privacy claim. The concurrence viewed it as a challenge to the coach’s failure
to disclose the information about Leah to her parents—a type of claim discussed in Part II, and to
which the author is similarly unreceptive in most circumstances. But the majority recognized that the
mother’s claim also implicitly included a challenge to the coach’s probing for this information in the
first place—an extraction-based claim that, as I argue further below, requires more solicitude. Id. at
303, 306.
122
C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005).
123
Id. at 184–85 (citing Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 309).
124
See, e.g., Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classroom, supra note 8, at 143–44, 191 (“The effect of
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fields v. Palmdale was a virtual relinquishment of a parent’s ability to
have a voice in what his or her child would be exposed to . . . . ”); Tara Dahl, Surveys in America’s
Classrooms? How Much Do Parents Really Know? Some Further Perspectives, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 473,
477–78 (2009) [hereinafter Dahl, Some Further Perspectives] (“[T]he Fields court failed to address the
parents’ primary concern, that a nonacademic, sexually explicit survey was administered to very young
students without parents informed consent.”); Elliott Davis, Unjustly Usurping the Parental Right:
Fields v. Palmdale School District, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1133,
1134 (2006) (stating that Fields “ignores parental interests”); Beth Garrison, “Children Are not Second
Class Citizens”: Can Parents Stop Public Schools from Treating Their Children Like Guinea Pigs?, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 147, 1999 (2004) (claiming that Fields demonstrates that the Protection of Pupil
Rights Act will be ignored by courts); Jesse Fu, Note, The Researcher’s Second Laboratory: Protecting
Our Children from Social Surveys in Public Schools in Light of Fields v. Palmdale School District, 80
S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 603–09 (2007) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s opinions in Fields contained analytical
flaws. . . . Specifically, though the court recognized that the claims are grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause, it failed to recognize the privacy claims under the
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Commentators have not focused on the familial privacy concerns about, as
the Gruenke court put it, “pry[ing] into private family activities,”125 much
less the informational privacy aspects of the cases. Instead, the critiques
either (1) proceed from the information-provision perspective in the Fields
and C.N. decisions and then argue that surveying students about sex
violates parental rights to decide how to expose their children to such
information,126 or (2) focus on the argument that these children were
improperly used as social research subjects without proper safeguards.127 I
suggest, however, that the overlap between the informational and familial
privacy rights in this context provides a useful additional lens for analyzing
these cases. The next section explores this approach.
C. Harnessing the Synergy Between the Informational and Familial
Privacy Rights
Neither the informational privacy right nor the familial privacy right,
standing alone, has been an ideal basis for challenging public schools’
extraction of their students’ information. The informational privacy claims
bump up against the unresolved question of whether the right is violated
when the government is only acquiring information for its own use without
disclosing it further. The familial privacy claims run into the challenge of
explaining precisely how schools infringe parents’ childrearing authority
by asking their children personal questions, a difficulty heightened by the
adverse precedents in the curriculum-dispute cases.
Even though neither of these privacy rights fits perfectly on its own,
they converge in an illuminating way when schools probe for information
about students’ personal and family lives. Such probing strikes right at the
intersection of informational and familial privacy, raising the potential for
both students and their parents to feel that the school is intruding on, as the
Supreme Court put it in Prince, the “private realm of family life.”128 Emily
Buss has forcefully argued against Justice William Douglas’ famous
dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder,129 in which he asserted that before Amish
Amendment—which are fundamental rights—are substantive due process rights.”); id. at 620–21
(stating C.N. stands for the proposition that schools may evade statutory prohibitions by claiming a
survey is voluntary).
125
Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307.
126
See, e.g., Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classroom, supra note 8, at 186 (“The court basically
indicated that greater administrative efficiency allowed diminished parental rights.”); Dahl, Some
Further Perspectives, supra note 124, at 478–79 (“[N]ot only does the Fields decision ‘affirm the right
of the Palmdale School Districts to survey its students, but rather, it affirms the broad power of public
schools to provide students with information they decide is educationally appropriate’. . . [and] to
determine curriculum. . . . But this may be too broad a power.”).
127
See, e.g., Fu, supra note 124, at 608–09 (noting that children are being used as human
“research subjects” without proper protections).
128
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
129
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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parents were permitted to remove their adolescent children from school,
the state should ask the children themselves what they wanted.130 Buss
states that “[a]rguably, the very asking of the question—‘Do you share
your parents’ beliefs, Frieda?’—imposes some harm.”131 Specifically,
“[s]uch a question raises the prospect of intra-family division . . . .”132 An
even stronger version of this critique can be made against the questioning
that occurred in C.N., where the school not only inquired into the details of
students’ family lives, but also implied that there was a right way for
family members to relate to one another, asking students to indicate
whether they agreed that “my parents often tell me they love me,” “if I
break one of my parents’ rules, I usually get punished,” and querying how
many times a week the student’s family ate dinner together.133 Such
questions not only raise the prospect of intra-family division, as Buss
feared, but indeed seem likely to prompt students to question whether their
family life is up to par.
Even when schools are not explicitly asking about students’ home life,
their probing into other aspects of students’ personal lives—romantic,
recreational, and so on—still has the potential to encroach on students’
sense of personal privacy, their parents’ sense of autonomy in guiding their
development, and the evolving parent-child relationship itself. Charles
Fried has eloquently described the interconnectedness of informational
privacy and intimacy, observing:
[P]rivacy . . . is necessarily related to ends and relations of
the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust.
Privacy is not merely a good technique for furthering these
fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply
inconceivable. They require a context of privacy or the
possibility of privacy for their existence. . . . [P]rivacy is the
necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as
oxygen is for combustion. . . . [I]ntimacy is the sharing of
information about one’s actions, beliefs, or emotions which
one does not share with all, and which one has the right not
to share with anyone. By conferring this right, privacy
creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and
love. . . . Privacy grants the control over information which
enables us to maintain degrees of intimacy.134
130
See Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 53 (1999)
(“While I share Douglas’s view that the Yoder decision is deficient in its account of children’s rights, I
think Douglas’s cure is worse than the disease.”).
131
Id. at 69.
132
Id.
133
C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2005).
134
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477–78, 484–85 (1968).

2015]

SHOW AND TELL?: STUDENTS’ PERSONAL LIVES, SCHOOLS, AND PARENTS

725

In extracting personal information from students and infringing upon their
own sense of privacy, schools may undermine the intimacy of the parentchild relationship as well, influencing the decisions that students make
about whether and how to discuss these matters with their parents.
Indeed, Fried’s account suggests that there is a synergy between the
informational privacy and familial privacy challenges typically brought
against schools’ extraction of students’ information—that, although courts
tend to view the two claims in isolation, they are in fact intertwined and
mutually reinforcing. Arguably, there is something of a hybrid right here: a
right of informational privacy surrounding the family as a unit, as opposed
to solely the individual student. Neil Richards has also more broadly
articulated the potential overlap between informational and decisional
privacy, arguing that “the informational/decisional binary is at best a fuzzy
means of categorizing two quite related interests” in autonomy.135 Daggett
also notes, in the related Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment context,
that the PPRA can be viewed as protecting both students’ informational
privacy and their parents’ familial and decisional privacy.136
Focusing on the synergy between students’ informational privacy
claims and their parents’ familial privacy claims also dovetails with
another argument made by several family law scholars: that where
children’s and parents’ interests converge as to a particular issue, the state
should tread particularly lightly. Emily Buss, for instance, has written that
in conflicts regarding the allocation of developmental control over children
(such as decisions over whether a child will attend school or have regular
visitation with grandparents), “[w]here the child’s views align with either
the parents’ or the state’s, the child’s position should have special
developmental force.”137 David Meyer similarly argues that “[t]he state’s
power to intrude upon family life should be more narrowly confined when
the state seeks to assert its values upon a family that is unified in its
resistance.”138
The convergence of the informational and familial privacy rights here
suggest that schools should be particularly cautious when extracting
personal information from students. When administering broad surveys,
schools should be more cognizant of the potential privacy-based concerns.
135
Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1093, 1106–07
(2006) (describing how, for example, certain seminal “decisional privacy” cases like Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), can also be read as informational privacy cases).
136
Daggett, supra note 8, at 63. She writes that “[m]any . . . clearly view the PPRA as providing
substantive parenting rights. . . . [Others] suggest[] that the statute in fact protects a sort of student
privacy; namely protection from government collection of certain information. . . . This Article
assumes that protecting both family privacy and student privacy are goals of the PPRA.” Id.
137
Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 44.
138
Meyer, supra note 99, at 580.
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The PPRA provides an important starting point in requiring parental
consent and/or notice and opt-out rights for such surveys, depending on
whether the survey is “required.”139 But not only does the PPRA lack a
provision for meaningful enforcement, it does not sufficiently protect the
constitutional privacy interests here. It does not make clear when a survey
counts as being “required,” and even when a survey is clearly required,
there is still no obligation for the school to send a copy of it to each family,
as opposed to (as in C.N.) just making it available for inspection at the
school.140
Meanwhile, at the individual level, which is not covered by the PPRA
at all, schools certainly should not shy away from trying to acquire
information when they feel that a student is being abused or neglected at
home, or is otherwise facing a real threat to her well-being and safety.
Similarly, in situations where students are in emotional distress and either
they or their parents solicit the assistance of a school counselor or
psychologist, it is unlikely that informational and familial privacy concerns
will be simultaneously present. Under these circumstances, either the
student or the student’s parents will be aligned with the public school. But
in situations where both informational and familial privacy concerns are
salient, and where there is no counter-veiling student-specific need to
extract the information in question, schools should avoid probing for
students’ personal information. Indeed, on top of the constitutional
concerns that extracting such information can raise, schools that acquire
such information can end up in a new quandary: what to do with it.
III. DISCLOSURE OF STUDENTS’ INFORMATION
Once schools have learned sensitive personal information about a
student—whether or not by their own affirmative steps—they must decide
whether to share that news with the students’ parents. Here, the abovedescribed convergence between students’ informational privacy rights and
their parents’ familial privacy rights breaks down, replaced by a
divergence that puts schools in a bind: while disclosure risks infringing a
student’s informational privacy, non-disclosure risks undermining the
parents’ ability to direct the upbringing of their child.
A. Informational Privacy
In some ways, the informational privacy questions surrounding public
139
See Daggett, supra note 8, at 59, 61. (“The bulk of PPRA gives parents consent of opting out
rights to keep their child from child from participating in certain school activities, such as certain
surveys and physical exams, which could generate sensitive information.”).
140
See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that prior to
the administration of the survey, the school made a copy of it available for parents to review).
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schools’ treatment of students’ personal information become simpler upon
moving from the extraction to the disclosure context. This situation maps
more neatly onto the initial Supreme Court conception of informational
privacy as protecting individuals from the government’s unauthorized
disclosure of their personal matters. But this scenario also raises a new,
vexing question of its own: do minors have any informational privacy
rights regarding governmental disclosures to their parents?
Courts have not reached consensus on this issue. In 2000, the Third
Circuit endorsed the viability of an informational privacy claim regarding a
police officer’s threat to disclose an eighteen-year-old man’s sexual
orientation to his grandfather.141 This is distinguishable, however, not only
because the man was an adult, but also because grandparents do not have
the constitutionally-protected interest in childrearing that parents
possess.142 Indeed, at least in the abortion context, the Supreme Court has
specifically upheld parental notification and consent requirements out of
deference to the importance of the parental role.143
Additionally, some states require, or at least explicitly permit,
healthcare providers to disclose information to a minor’s parents about the
minor’s contraction of a sexually transmitted infection, alcohol or drug
dependency, or need for mental health services.144 Such statutes tend to
141

Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192–93, 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (stating that courts should give significant
deference to parents’ decisions regarding their children’s relationships with their grandparents).
143
See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 405 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a
Utah statute that requires a physician to notify, if possible, the parents of a dependent, unmarried,
minor female before performing an abortion). The Court emphasized the importance of the parental
role, stating that “parents have an important ‘guiding role’ to play in the upbringing of their children,
which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions.” Id. at 410 (internal citations
omitted). The Court has never ruled that a judicial bypass option is necessary for statutes requiring
parental notification, although it has held it necessary for statutes requiring parental consent. See Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1990) (“[A]lthough our cases have
required bypass procedures for parental consent statutes, we have not decided whether parental notice
statutes must contain such procedures. . . . We leave the question open, because, whether or not the
Fourteenth Amendment requires notice statutes to contain bypass procedures. H.B. 319’s bypass
procedure meets the requirements . . . for parental consent statutes . . . .”).
144
See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-508 (West 2014) (stating that when a minor seeks medical
care for a sexually transmitted disease, “a physician or member of a medical staff may inform the
spouse, parent, or guardian of any minor as to the treatment given or needed but shall not be obligated
to do so. The information may be given to or withheld from the spouse, parent, or guardian without the
consent and over the express objection of the minor”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124260 (West
2014) (stating that minors, who are at least twelve years old, may consent to mental health treatment
depending on their maturity level, as determined by a physician, but “the mental health treatment or
counseling of a minor authorized by this section shall include involvement of the minor’s parent or
guardian, unless the professional person who is treating or counseling the minor, after consulting with
the minor, determines that the involvement would be inappropriate”); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
210/5 (West 2014) (“Any physician, advanced practice nurse, or physician assistant . . . who provides
counseling to a minor patient who has come into contact with any sexually transmitted disease . . . may,
but shall not be obligated to, inform the parent, parents, or guardian of the minor as to the treatment
142
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place decision-making discretion in the hands of healthcare providers, not
minors. These laws undermine the notion of a robust informational privacy
right for minors vis-à-vis their parents.
That said, numerous commentators have argued that minors should
have a protected realm of informational privacy even with regard to their
parents. Caitlin Cullitan, for example, has argued that strict scrutiny should
apply whenever the state discloses (or requires others to disclose)
information to a minor’s parents on sex-related issues, reasoning that
“[r]efraining from disclosing a minor’s private information to a parent
actually maintains the status quo in families, instead of impeding upon
parents’ autonomy.”145
Adam Kretz likewise argues that the Constitution should prevent
schools from disclosing students’ sexual orientation to their parents.146
Holning Lau similarly advocates a “categorical rule unique to children: the
government should not out gay and lesbian youth unless the government
shows that doing so prevents cognizable harms.”147 Indeed, Cullitan, Kretz,
and Lau all argue that given the intensity of identity-development during
adolescence, minors’ informational privacy rights should be stronger than
those possessed by adults.148 “[A] special right is sometimes necessary for
childhood contexts,” Lau reasons.149 Helen Gilbert similarly suggests that
“minors are particularly vulnerable to the threat of disclosure of their
personal information,” and that the informational privacy framework
should take this into account.150 Benjamin Shmueli and Ayelet BlecherPrigat likewise emphasize the need for intra-family privacy, drawing upon
domestic and international conceptions of privacy to argue that “children
should have an individual right for privacy against their parents.”151
So far, however, no court has actually ruled in favor of a minor
claiming that her privacy rights were violated by a governmental disclosure
to her parents. The closest a court came to doing so was in Nguon v.
given or needed.”); see Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is it Anyway? An Updated Model of
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 260 (2005)
(“Rather than determining competence, healthcare providers have a responsibility for evaluating a
patient’s decision-making capacity prior to obtaining valid informed consent.”).
145
Cullitan, supra, note 8, at 459.
146
Kretz, supra note 8, at 408–16.
147
Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317,
371 (2007).
148
Cullitan, supra note 8, at 446, 450; Kretz, supra note 8, at 409–411; Lau, supra note 147, at
370–71.
149
Lau, supra note 147, at 370.
150
Gilbert, supra note 35, at 1400–01. Like Cullitan and Lau, Gilbert also emphasizes that
“minors’ identities are not fixed, but are instead malleable and subject to influence,” suggesting that
society needs to give them room for independence. Id. at 1401.
151
Benjamin Shmueli & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Privacy for Children, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 759, 763 (2011).
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152

Wolf, where a California district court held that the student had a
“[c]onstitutionally protected privacy right with respect to disclosure of her
sexual orientation” to her parents.”153 But the court ultimately concluded
that this right had not been violated here because the school principal was
justified in telling the mother that the student had been physically
demonstrative with another girl to explain why the student had been
suspended for inappropriate displays of public affection on school
grounds.154 The court added that “[i]f Charlene’s expressions of her
sexuality had not risen to the level of IPDA, clearly [Principal] Wolf could
not have gratuitously told her parents that she was gay or that she was
engaging in displays of affection, within appropriate bounds, with another
girl.”155
Other courts have been less sympathetic to such claims. In Port
Washington Teachers Association v. Board of Education,156 a district court
in New York rejected the argument that a school policy to disclose
students’ pregnancies to their parents violated the students’ constitutional
rights.157 “No Court has created such a right to privacy for minors, and the
Court here declines to do so as well,” wrote the court.158 The court
reasoned that parental notification of pregnancy differed from parental
notification of abortion, and added that courts in “parental notification
cases have found that notification of abortion is far less burdensome than
the consent to abortion situation.”159 It is unclear, however, whether the
plaintiffs explicitly challenged the policy in informational privacy terms,
or only framed their opposition as an abortion-specific decisional privacy
claim.160
The clearest defeat for the argument that minors have informational
privacy rights against their parents came this past summer, in Wyatt v.
Fletcher.161 In a two to one split, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument
that a student’s privacy rights were infringed when her coaches disclosed

152

517 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
Id. at 1191.
154
Id. at 1177, 1194.
155
Id. at 1195.
156
No. 04-CV1357TCPWDW, 2009 WL 47447 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2006).
157
Id. at *7.
158
Id. at *6.
159
Id. at *7.
160
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case, but solely on the alternative grounds
(also reached by the district court) that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n v.
Bd. of Educ. of Port Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist., 478 F.3d 494, 502 (2d Cir. 2007). The court noted
that “the remaining portions of [the district court’s] opinion turn out to have been unnecessary to its
decision and may therefore be characterized as dicta.” Id. For a detailed critique of the district court’s
decision, see Prober, supra note 8, at 559.
161
Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 496–97 (5th Cir. 2013).
153
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162

her sexual orientation to her mother. A magistrate judge had let her case
go forward, denying summary judgment on the grounds that the Fifth
Circuit protected informational privacy, that the student had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her sexual orientation, and that there was a
factual dispute as to whether her coaches had a legitimate interest in
revealing her sexual orientation to her mother.163 Indeed, the lower court
thought that the student’s rights were clearly established and that there was
the potential to pierce the school officials’ qualified immunity.164 But the
Fifth Circuit majority disagreed, ruling that there was “no clearly
established law holding that a student in a public secondary school has a
privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment that precludes school
officials from discussing with a parent the student’s private matters,
including matters relating to sexual activity of the student.”165 The court
found that “the ‘disclosure’ here was only to the student’s mother; it was
not discussed with other coaches, teachers, or students.”166
The Wyatt dissent, by contrast, echoed the lower court’s argument that
the student had alleged a violation of her clearly established constitutional
rights.167 The dissent argued that the Fifth Circuit had recognized the
concept of informational privacy, that this privacy right included sexual
orientation, and that precedent compelled its extension to high school
students.168 It concluded that the key question was “whether the coaches
had a legitimate interest which outweighed [the student’s] right to
privacy.”169
Interestingly, the Wyatt majority seemed slightly open to the idea that
it mattered whether the school officials had a legitimate interest in
disclosing this information. After first rejecting the idea that the student
had an informational privacy right vis-à-vis her mother, the majority
nonetheless argued that “disclosure of [the student’s] relationship was in
the interest of the student and became necessary only after [the student],
allegedly influenced by [the older student with whom she was involved],
violated team rules and policy, which were in place for the benefit and
safety of students.”170 That the majority bothered to mention this indicates
at least some sympathy with the idea that truly gratuitous disclosures
would be problematic.
162

Id.
Wyatt v. Kilgore Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 6:10–cv–674, 2011 WL 6016467, at *4, *5–6, *13,*14
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011).
164
Id. at *13–14.
165
Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 499.
166
Id. at 508.
167
Id. at 510, 518 (Graves, J., dissenting).
168
Id. at 513–14, 518.
169
Id. at 514.
170
Id. at 508.
163
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Both Nguon and even Wyatt thus implicitly sketch out an approach that
I develop further below: that the motivation and justification for the
school’s disclosure should be an important part of the informational
privacy analysis. Neither decision, however, discussed how students’
informational privacy rights should co-exist with parents’ own rights to
direct their children’s upbringing—the other piece of the puzzle, to which I
now turn.
B. Familial Privacy
Schools that choose not to disclose students’ sensitive personal
information to their parents certainly avoid any potential informational
privacy claims on their students’ behalf. But in doing so, they open
themselves to another risk: claims brought by parents alleging that the
school’s secrecy interfered with their own rights as parents, thus violating
their own familial privacy.
The high-water mark for such claims is Arnold v. Board of
Education,171 in which two sets of parents whose minor son and daughter
conceived a child filed a lawsuit alleging that two school officials had
coerced their children to seek an abortion and to keep the plan secret from
their parents.172 The Eleventh Circuit agreed that “a parent’s constitutional
right to direct the upbringing of a minor is violated when the minor is
coerced to refrain from discussing with the parent an intimate decision,”
concluding that the complaint “sufficiently state[d] a cause of action for
invasion in the familial right to privacy.”173 The court explained that the
school’s actions here, at least as described in the complaint, had interfered
with parental authority by depriving the parents of the opportunity to instill
their own values in their children.174 But the court emphasized that it was
not requiring school officials to disclose students’ sensitive personal
information to their parents; instead, it was merely prohibiting schools
from “coerc[ing] minors to refrain from communicating with their
parents.”175
The Third Circuit picked up this thread in Gruenke, suggesting that the
school swim coach had violated Leah’s mother’s familial privacy rights not
only by “pry[ing] into private family activities”176 (as discussed above in
Part II.B), but also by not notifying the mother about his concerns

171

880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 308–09.
173
Id. at 312 (“[A] parent’s constitutional right to direct the upbringing of a minor is violated
when the minor is coerced to refrain from discussing with the parent an intimate decision . . . .”).
174
Id. at 313.
175
Id. at 314.
176
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000).
172
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177

regarding Leah’s possible pregnancy. The court observed that the case
presented “another example of the arrogation of the parental role by a
school similar to, although not as egregious as, Arnold,” strikingly adding
that it had “considerable doubt about [school counselors’] right to withhold
information of this nature from the parents.”178
The Third Circuit ruled more decisively against the parents in Anspach
v. City of Philadelphia,179 in which the parents of a 16-year-old girl sued
after a public health center gave their daughter the morning-after pill
without notifying them.180 Their claim was accompanied by one brought by
their daughter herself, who claimed that the defendants had violated her
own rights to “parental guidance.”181 The court was unconvinced, writing
that imposing a constitutional requirement on state actors to contact parents
in such situations “would undermine the minor’s right to privacy and
exceed the scope of the familial liberty interest protected under the
Constitution.”182 Acknowledging its suggestion in Gruenke that school
officials there should have consulted with the parents, the court pointed out
that here, unlike in Gruenke, the minor had acted on her own initiative to
seek out the center’s services.183 The plaintiffs had failed to plead any facts
suggesting that the center “inserted itself” into the daughter’s decision or
interfered with the parent-child relationship.184 “The real problem alleged
by [the] [p]laintiffs [was] not that the state actors interfered with the
Anspachs as parents; rather, it [was] that the state actors did not assist the
Anspachs as parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship,”
the court explained.185 “However, the Anspachs are not entitled to that
assistance under the Due Process Clause.”186
Thus, just as no student has prevailed in claiming that a school violated
her informational privacy rights by disclosing her sensitive personal
information to her parents, no parent has prevailed in arguing that a school
violated her familial privacy rights by not disclosing such information.187
177
Id. at 306. As discussed above, however, the Third Circuit ultimately held that there was no
“clearly established” right here, and so qualified immunity still applied. Id. at 307; see supra note 106
and accompanying text (stating the court’s decision that the “family privacy right was not clearly
established enough to overcome the coach’s qualified immunity”).
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Id. at 306–07.
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503 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2007).
180
Id. at 258.
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Id. at 260.
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Id. at 262.
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Id. at 270–71.
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Id. at 271.
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Id. at 266 (emphasis in original).
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However, Arnold falls into a different category because the parents were not merely
challenging the school’s non-disclosure, but also their affirmative efforts at concealment. Arnold v. Bd.
of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir. 1989).
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Does the difficulty of winning such claims —in either direction—make
sense? Below, I argue that it does, but that clearer guideposts, stemming
from a clearer underlying rationale, are needed.
C. Reconciling the Tension Between the Informational and Familial
Privacy Rights
The informational and familial privacy rights point in opposite
directions when it comes to public schools’ disclosure of students’ personal
information. Strong versions of both rights cannot co-exist here.
Otherwise, disclosure to parents would simultaneously be prohibited and
required. But the above discussion points toward a path for reconciling
these two competing privacy interests: providing schools with broad
discretion to use their own best judgment as to whether to disclose
students’ personal information to their parents, with that discretion
bounded by the students’ informational privacy right on one end and the
familial privacy right on the other.
Such an approach is analogous to the balance that the Supreme Court
has struck in navigating the competing currents of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. Like the informational and familial privacy rights,
these two constitutional protections sometimes converge but sometimes
come into tension.188 The Supreme Court has held that although both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses impose certain prohibitions,
“‘there is room for play in the joints’ between the Clauses, some space for
legislative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.”189 Within this space—which the
Court has termed the “corridor between the Religion Clauses”190—the state
can exercise its discretion.
Similarly, the informational and familial privacy rights each impose
limitations on how schools should handle students’ personal information.
On the one hand, students’ informational privacy rights should prevent
schools from disclosing their sensitive personal information to their parents
188

As Erwin Chemerinsky explains,
To a large extent, the establishment and free exercise clauses are complementary.
Both protect freedom of religious belief and actions. Many government actions
would simultaneously violate both of these provisions. . . . Yet, there also is often a
tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses. Government actions to
facilitate free exercise might be challenged as impermissible establishments, and
government efforts to refrain from establishing religion might be objected to as
denying the free exercise of religion.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1182–83 (3d ed. 2006)
(footnotes omitted).
189
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
190
Id. at 720.
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without any legitimate justification. Even if minors’ informational privacy
rights are weaker than those of adults, and even if such rights are further
limited in the context of parental disclosure, minors should still be
protected from truly arbitrary or malicious governmental disclosures of
their sensitive personal information to their parents.
This is where the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Wyatt fell short. It is
hard to counter the majority’s conclusion that the privacy right invoked by
the student was not “clearly established” in the Fifth Circuit at the time of
the incident, as required to overcome the school officials’ qualified
immunity.191 The dissent, in arguing to the contrary, did not address the
lack of any precedent involving disclosure to a minor’s own parents, nor
did it acknowledge the special issues raised by such a case.192 But the
majority should have taken the opportunity to clarify the scope of this right
going forward. Instead, it danced around the issue, first suggesting that this
was an open-and-shut case and then briefly adding that the school officials’
disclosure seemed justified anyway.193 This latter conclusion, however,
was based on one particular reading of heavily disputed facts: although the
coaches claimed that they disclosed the information because the student
was violating team rules and policies (due to her girlfriend’s influence), the
student disputed all of this and claimed that the coaches were actually
motivated by personal animosity toward her.194 The majority should
instead have ruled that although there was no clearly established right at
the time the coaches acted, thus dooming this particular claim, it was
heretofore recognizing an informational privacy right on students’ part to
be free from governmental disclosures of their sensitive personal
information to any other individuals, including their parents, without a
legitimate justification. The existence of such a legitimate justification
should be a fact-specific inquiry.
On the other hand, the family privacy right should prevent schools
from encouraging—let alone coercing—students to keep secrets from their
parents. The Arnold and Gruenke courts agreed that as a “matter of
common sense,” if not constitutional duty, school personnel should
encourage communication between students and their parents.195 While
schools may not be required to “foster the parent/child relationship,” as the
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Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 510–18 (Graves, J., dissenting).
193
See id. at 508 (majority opinion) (“[T]here is no controlling Fifth Circuit authority . . . showing
a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment privacy right that prohibits school officials from
communicating to parents information regarding minor students’ interests, even when private matters
of sex are involved.”).
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Id. at 514–15 (Graves, J. dissenting).
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Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d
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196

Anspach court noted, the familial privacy right should prevent schools
from inhibiting it. Such allegations—just like allegations that a school
disclosed a student’s sensitive personal information without a legitimate
justification—should trigger a fact-specific inquiry.
This approach leaves significant room for “play in the joints” between
the informational privacy and familial privacy rights. Provided that schools
are not disclosing students’ personal information to their parents without a
legitimate justification, nor influencing them to keep such information
secret from their parents, they should be free to exercise their pedagogical
discretion as to how to handle each individual situation, at least without
fearing liability from a constitutional perspective.
Such a discretion-maximizing approach to disclosure decisions is not
only analogous to the balance that the Supreme Court has struck in the
religion context, but is also good policy. In these sorts of cases, the “right”
resolution—the one that best serves the interests of the student and his or
her family—is going to vary tremendously depending on family dynamics,
the student’s own personality and inclinations, and the underlying
information involved. Indeed, recent psychological research on adolescent
privacy indicates how complex this topic is. Researchers have found that
“[a]dolescents whose parents know relatively more about their day-to-day
lives show lower levels of drug and alcohol use, delinquency, school
problems, . . . depressed mood . . . higher self-esteem[,] and better school
performance.”197 But it is unclear whether adolescents reap such benefits
when their parents receive that information from others, or whether it is the
child-parent sharing itself (as the result of a well-functioning relationship)
that is particularly helpful.198 If the former explanation is correct, then
schools’ disclosures of students’ personal information should often be
beneficial, by providing parents with information that helps them “respond
adequately to their child’s needs.”199 If, however, the latter explanation is
more accurate—that sharing information with one’s parents increases
and/or reflects a child’s sense of “belongingness”—then school disclosures
could potentially undermine the parent/child relationship by depriving
196

Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 503 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).
Nancy Darling et al., Predictors of Adolescents’ Disclosure to Parents and Perceived Parental
Knowledge: Between—and Within—Person Differences, 35 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 667, 667
(2006). By the same token, “[k]eeping secrets from parents was associated with physical complaints
and depressive mood in adolescence.” Catrin Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets from Parents:
Advantages and Disadvantages of Secrecy in Adolescence, 31 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 123, 132
(2002) [hereinafter Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets].
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See Catrin Finkenauer et al., Perceiving Concealment in Relationships Between Parents and
Adolescents: Links with Parental Behavior, 12 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 387, 389 (2005) [hereinafter
Finkenauer et al., Perceiving Concealment] (describing the lack of research that investigates
“concealment from the perspectives” of both parents and children).
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students of the chance to share information on their own terms and by
making parents aware that their child is concealing information from
them.201
Moreover, researchers consider some degree of adolescent secrecy to
be functional and developmentally appropriate.202 Not surprisingly, school
counselors have identified “[t]he complexity of navigating a collaborative
relationship with parents while respecting their responsibilities and
honoring student confidentiality” as the most common, challenging
dilemma that they face.203 By providing schools with a broad “corridor”
between the informational and familial privacy rights, courts can
encourage schools to take a student-specific approach, informed by the
pedagogical discretion and expertise, when deciding whether and how to
disclose information to parents.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO PREVENT SCHOOL
DISRUPTION OF THE FAMILY DYNAMIC
Having looked separately at schools’ extraction and disclosure of
students’ personal information, it is illuminating to step back and consider
them together. For one thing, the two phenomena can be factually linked.
The disclosure question sometimes comes up precisely because the school
has sought out the information in the first place, as in Gruenke and

200
Some researchers have emphasized the importance of adolescents’ sense of control over which
what sensitive information they want to share with their parents. See, e.g., Skyler T. Hawk et al.,
Adolescents’ Perceptions of Privacy Invasion in Reaction to Parental Solicitation and Control, 28 J.
EARLY ADOLESCENCE 583, 605 (2008) (“Parents who trust their adolescents to disclose voluntarily and
responsibly might consider making this good faith explicitly known, and contemplate the use of
information-gathering strategies that afford teenagers a sense of control in sharing aspects of their
personal lives.”). Relatedly, research suggests that “secrecy in adolescence may be a mixed blessing. It
may facilitate the accomplishment of developmental tasks by enhancing adolescents’ emotional
autonomy and independence, but at the same time, it may exert a prize in the form of physical
complaints and depressive mood.” Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets, supra note 197, at 133.
201
See Finkenauer et al., Perceiving Concealment, supra note 198, at 401 (“[P]arents’ perception
of child concealment is associated with poorer parenting behavior toward their child.”).
202
See Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets, supra note 197, at 124 (describing secrecy as helping
“to facilitate the second individuation process, a developmental task that is at the core of
adolescence”—namely, relinquishing dependence on one’s parents and becoming emotionally
autonomous); Skyler T. Hawk et al., Mind Your Own Business! Longitudinal Relations Between
Perceived Privacy Invasion and Adolescent-Parent Conflict, 23 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 511, 517–18 (2009)
(“[A]dolescents’ own, increasing sense of empowerment contributes to their willingness to deal directly
with privacy boundary turbulence. . . . It is important for parents, adolescents, and professionals
assisting families to keep in mind that conflict over privacy should not be viewed as entirely negative.
Instead, it likely plays an important role in openly negotiating changing social expectations for
adolescents.” (citation omitted)).
203
Nancy Bodenhorn, Exploratory Study of Common and Challenging Ethical Dilemmas
Experienced by Professional School Counselors, 10 PROF. SCH. COUNSELING 195, 200 (2006).

2015]

SHOW AND TELL?: STUDENTS’ PERSONAL LIVES, SCHOOLS, AND PARENTS

737

204

Wyatt. The more information that schools extract, the more disclosure
quandaries they will face.
But the phenomena are also linked in a deeper way. Both raise core
questions about how schools should approach their role in students’
personal and family lives. Indeed, both extraction and disclosure place
pressure on the sense of the family as a private sphere. As discussed above,
schools’ probing for students’ personal information—certainly when the
requested information specifically touches on their parental relationships,
but sometimes even when it relates to other aspects of their “outside
school” lives—has the potential to undermine familial intimacy. And once
the school has such information, both possible routes—disclosure and nondisclosure—have the potential to alter the family dynamic as well. Either
the school and the student share a secret of which the parent is unaware, or
the school is acting as the intermediary between the student and his or her
parents.
Taken as a whole, the regime proposed by this Article seeks to
minimize the potential for schools to insert themselves into familial
relationships and distort the family dynamic. On the extraction front, under
this Article’s approach, schools would refrain from probing for students’
sensitive personal information—whether by surveys or direct
questioning—unless (1) they believe that a student is facing an actual
threat to her well-being or (2) their involvement has been solicited by the
student or parent. In the case of larger surveys, this second showing could
be made by providing parents and students with an advance copy of the
survey and requesting (in language making clear that they have a real
choice) their affirmative consent for participation. Such restraint would
further the overlapping informational and familial privacy rights implicated
here.
When it comes to disclosure, meanwhile, some distortion of the parentchild relationship is inevitable. Schools should thus be able to make a caseby-case analysis of which course best serves the student and familial
interests here, provided that they have properly obtained the information in
the first place (under the above-described standard), and they are neither
influencing students to keep secrets from their parents nor disclosing such
information without any legitimate reason for doing so.
With these principles in mind, it is helpful to apply some of the cases
discussed above. In the information-extraction context, Gruenke stands out
as being fairly consistent with this Article’s approach, while Fields and
C.N. fall short. The Gruenke court, while framing the issue slightly
differently, did recognize that pressuring a student into taking a pregnancy
204
In both cases, the school administrators took affirmative action to question students after
suspicions of pregnancy or homosexuality arose. Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 500–01 (5th Cir.
2013); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2000).
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test (a form of information-extraction) and “pry[ing] into private family
activities” placed a serious imposition upon the privacy interests of the
student and her parents.205 This Article’s approach would similarly find a
valid informational privacy claim here, because (1) there was insufficient
evidence that the student was facing an actual threat to her well-being; and
(2) the coach’s involvement was not solicited by either the student or her
parent. Although the second point is obvious, the first point is a closer one,
given the strong advisability of medical care during pregnancy. It is
certainly possible to imagine a situation where a school official genuinely
fears that a student has no idea that she is pregnant and is concerned for her
(and her potential child’s) health and safety. In such circumstances, it
would be permissible under this Article’s approach for the school official
to raise the possibility with the student in a non-probing manner. (Indeed,
the official could likely do this without directly prying for answers, in
which case there may be no actual information-extraction at all.) Here,
however, the coach went far beyond mentioning the possibility to the
student. He tried to discuss sex and pregnancy with her, and even pressured
her into taking an actual pregnancy test, not to mention the disclosure of
his concerns to other teammates and their parents.206 The Third Circuit
correctly ruled in favor of the student’s informational privacy claim.207
By contrast, both Fields and C.N. did not give sufficient consideration
to the informational privacy interests implicated by the way in which the
defendant school districts conducted the respective surveys about
extremely intimate topics. (To be fair, in Fields, the plaintiffs themselves
failed to bring an informational privacy claim.)208 Under this Article’s
approach, there would be a valid informational privacy claim against both
school districts because (1) there was no evidence of a particularized threat
to any student’s well-being and (2) neither the students nor the parents
solicited the schools’ involvement in these very personal topics. In these
cases, while the first point is incontestable, the second point is at least
slightly closer, given this Article’s suggestion that with appropriate notice
and consent, school surveys can be permissible. But here, neither survey
met that bar. The notice itself was insufficient under this Article’s
standard. In Fields, parents were not provided with copies of the surveys
(or even given a full description of what they entailed);209 in C.N., the only
way for parents to see them was to review a copy in the school offices, an
inconvenient option used by a very small percentage of the parents.210 The
205
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consent arrangements were also lacking: in Fields, the consent was not
meaningful (given the incomplete description of the survey);211 and in
C.N., no consent form was distributed to parents, and the students were
made to feel that the survey was mandatory.212
In the information-disclosure context, meanwhile, the courts’ rulings in
favor of the defendants in both Nguon and Anspach—despite the opposite
fact patterns in these cases—are both consistent with this Article’s
proposed approach. Nguon challenged the disclosure of a student’s
personal information to her parents,213 while Anspach challenged the nondisclosure214—but in both cases, the state officials acted within the broad
zone of discretion identified by this Article: they did not disclose
information without any legitimate reason for doing so, nor did they
influence minors to withhold this information from their parents. And, in
both cases, there had been no improper extraction of the information in the
first place: Charlene Nguon was observed engaging in public displays of
affection with her girlfriend,215 and Melissa Anspach asked for the
morning-after pill itself.216 Accordingly, both cases “played in the joints”
between the informational and familial privacy rights. Wyatt, by contrast,
is the more troubling case here, both because the school coaches allegedly
extracted the information about her sexual orientation improperly
(interrogating her about her relationship with another woman) and because
the Fifth Circuit suggested that there may be no limits on schools’ ability
to disclose students’ personal information to their parents.217 Wyatt did,
however, include some language suggesting that the reasons for a school’s
disclosure may be relevant, and future courts should expand on this
point.218
V. CONCLUSION
There is no way for schools to shield themselves from learning about
students’ personal and family lives. Students simply spend too much time
at school, and develop too many relationships there, for schools to remain
unaware of anything beyond pure academic performance. Nor would such
unawareness even be desirable. We want schools to ask questions when
they believe that a student is facing a real threat to her well-being, or when
a student—or her parent—initiates the school’s involvement. In other
211
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circumstances, however, the overlapping informational and familial
privacy concerns should prompt more restraint on schools’ part to avoid
inserting themselves into the delicate family dynamic. Provided that
schools exercise this restraint, they should have a wide zone of discretion
to decide whether to disclose students’ personal information to their
parents, as long as they remain within the corridor of neither pressuring
students to keep secrets from their parents nor disclosing students’ personal
information without a legitimate reason for doing so. Taken as a whole,
this Article’s proposed regime will best further the alternately converging
and diverging informational and familial privacy rights, and reduce the
potential for school distortion of the family dynamic.

